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Effects of Changes in Tax/Beneﬁ t Policies in Austria 2003–2005
MICHAEL FUCHS and CHRISTINE LIETZ*
European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research 
and Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to evaluate whether policy reforms in Aus-
tria between 2003 and 2005 were successful in meeting redistributive objectives 
and in reducing poverty. The authors use the tax/beneﬁ t micro-simulation 
model EUROMOD for this analysis. In the period under review the 2004–2005 
tax reform was introduced and contributions to health insurance were raised. 
On the beneﬁ t side no major changes took place, the main family beneﬁ ts 
were not even indexed to inﬂ ation. The authors ﬁ nd that the measures had no 
signiﬁ cant impact on poverty and income distribution. However, in total they 
increased the disposable income of almost all groups of the population.
Keywords: policy reform, micro-simulation, income inequality, redistribu-
tion, Austria
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2007, Vol. 43, No. 3: 611–636
Introduction
The Austrian welfare system does not focus primarily on persons at risk of pov-
erty. As the Austrian National Action Plan for Social Inclusion states, ‘family 
policy is based on the principle of horizontal compensation, with state beneﬁ ts 
being redistributed away from persons without dependent children to those who 
have childcare obligations’ [National Action Plan… 2001: 18]. However, the same 
source points out that ‘in Austria there is a general consensus that combat-
ing poverty and social exclusion are central matters of political concern for 
society’ [Second National Action Plan … 2003: 3]. Therefore, it could be argued 
that in Austria the approach to combating poverty is ‘preventive’, as it includes 
the whole population – not just the socially disadvantaged – in the welfare state 
system. In fact, the redistributive impact of taxes and beneﬁ ts from high- to low-
income classes is considerable.
* Direct all correspondence to: Michael Fuchs, European Centre for Social Welfare Policy 
and Research, Berggasse 17, 1090 Vienna, e-mail: fuchs@euro.centre.org; Christine Lietz, In-
stitute for Advanced Studies, Stumpergasse 56, Vienna 1060, Austria, e-mail: lietz@ihs.ac.at.
 A longer version of this paper was submitted to the University of Essex, United King-
dom, as a EUROMOD Working Paper. It was funded by the Jubiläumsfonds of the Aus-
trian National Bank (Project No. 11294). The analyses rely on micro-data from the Austrian 
version of the EU-SILC made available by Statistik Austria.
socrev2007-1.indb   611 3.9.2007   18:41:38
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2007, Vol. 43, No. 3
612
The aim of this paper is to evaluate whether the tax/beneﬁ t policy reforms 
introduced between 2003 and 2005 were successful in reducing poverty and in 
meeting redistributive objectives (connected with the reduction of inequality 
of disposable income with respect to differences in primary income and family 
composition). The questions addressed in this article are:
– Who beneﬁ ted and who lost out from the changes to taxes and beneﬁ ts?
–  Did vulnerable groups, particularly children or the elderly, gain from these 
reforms?
–  What were the effects on people living in different household types (e.g. 
households with and without children, single parents, etc.)?
–  What were the consequences of the policy changes in terms of social security 
contributions, income tax, and cash beneﬁ ts paid/received by each income 
quintile?
– How did the redistributive impact of these instruments change over time?
In order to answer these questions, we use the tax/beneﬁ t micro-simulation 
model EUROMOD. The tax/beneﬁ t model is based on representative household 
micro-data and is designed to analyse the effects of changes to components of 
disposable household income, particularly social security contributions, personal 
taxes, and cash beneﬁ ts. Austria is one of the few countries that make little use 
of tax/beneﬁ t micro-simulation for national policy analysis and debate. Instead, 
it usually evaluates tax/beneﬁ t changes using administrative data, which refer 
only to individuals, or by analysing the effects on ‘typical’ model families. How-
ever, when analysing distributional effects the household context is crucial, and 
there are limitations to measuring the effects on model families, as the effects 
represent only a certain part of the whole population. In contrast, tax/beneﬁ t 
micro-simulation models are able to analyse the effects of policy changes and of 
their interactions with already existing policies on all population groups, both at 
the individual and at the household level.
We use the EU-SILC 2004 with income data for 2003 as the source of data 
for the analysis.1 The special approach we apply makes it possible to measure 
the ‘pure policy effect’ of the reforms. The approach is described in more detail 
below.
This article begins with a description of methodological issues, like the ca-
pabilities of EUROMOD and tax/beneﬁ t micro-simulation models in general, 
followed by explanations of the approach and deﬁ nitions we apply throughout 
the paper. A short overview is then provided of Austria’s position in Europe with 
regard to the structure of taxes and beneﬁ ts and social inclusion and income dis-
tribution. This is followed by a description of the policy reforms introduced be-
1 The EU-SILC (Survey on Income and Living Conditions) micro-data including detailed 
national income variables is provided by Statistik Austria (see Statistik Austria [2006a] and 
http://www.statistik.at/fachbereich_03/eusilc_txt.shtml). The sample comprised 11 524 in-
dividuals in 4521 households.
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tween 2003 and 2005 and an evaluation of their impact on poverty and income 
distribution. The article closes with a summary of ﬁ ndings and conclusions.
Methodological issues
Tax/beneﬁ t micro-simulation and EUROMOD
The tax/beneﬁ t micro-simulation model EUROMOD is a ﬂ exible tool that enables 
research on the effects of policy reforms that have an impact on incomes, poverty, 
inequality, and social inclusion.2 Particularly important for the purpose at hand 
is that it facilitates an analysis of policy changes at a very high level of detail and 
coherence. With EUROMOD it is possible to analyse single components of the 
tax/beneﬁ t system in a broken-down form, which are hard to obtain from other 
sources (e.g. beneﬁ ts broken down by income, age, gender and household type).
Micro-simulation models are based on household micro-data from repre-
sentative sources. Disposable income is calculated for each household in the da-
taset by using elements of income taken from survey data (e.g. original income 
from employment) combined with components that are simulated by the model 
(taxes and beneﬁ ts). The calculations are performed once for a basic scenario – in 
this case the tax/beneﬁ t system in place in 2003 – and then again for one or more 
policy change(s). These policy changes can take the form of potential reforms that 
policy-makers or researchers might be interested in, or they can take the form 
of real changes from one year to the next – in this case the tax/beneﬁ t changes 
between 2003 and 2005.
The basic output from EUROMOD is the micro-level change in household 
disposable income resulting from changes in taxes and/or beneﬁ ts. This provides 
the basis for calculating:
– impacts on measures of poverty and inequality
–  differential effects on groups of socio-economic interest, classiﬁ ed by individ-
ual or household characteristics
– estimates of aggregate effects on state revenue and expenditure
The areas of policies covered by EUROMOD include social security contri-
butions (both employee and employer contributions3), income tax, and cash ben-
eﬁ ts. Not covered, for example, are indirect taxes (e.g. value added tax) and ben-
eﬁ ts in kind (e.g. free access to health and education services). Furthermore, the 
underlying micro-data does not usually include information on social insurance 
contribution histories, so it is not possible to fully simulate social beneﬁ ts that are 
2 For a detailed description of EUROMOD see Sutherland [2001]; for a discussion of the 
applicability of indicators of social inclusion in EUROMOD see Atkinson [2002].
3 As social security contributions by employers do not affect disposable income, they are 
not included in this paper.
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contributory (pensions,4 unemployment beneﬁ ts, sickness beneﬁ t, maternity ben-
eﬁ t, etc.). These are, therefore, drawn directly from the data. On the other hand, 
simulated beneﬁ ts are fully simulated, which means that possible non-take-up by 
eligible persons is not taken into account (this is especially the case of social assist-
ance). Measures of poverty and inequality in income contribution consequently 
tend to indicate lower values than in the underlying original datasets.
Measuring the ‘pure’ impact of policy changes
A common approach to analysing the effect of reforms of the tax/beneﬁ t sys-
tem is to use income data for successive years. However, a change observed by 
this method reﬂ ects not only the impact of policy reforms but also the impact 
of other inﬂ uences, such as changes in the level of economic activity, changes in 
demographic composition, or changes in the distribution of sources of primary 
income.5 It is difﬁ cult or impossible to break down the observed change into the 
individual parts stemming from each particular inﬂ uence, not least because they 
are not independent of each other. However, static micro-simulation models, such 
as EUROMOD, facilitates an approach in which most inﬂ uences are held constant 
and we are then able to focus on the ‘pure’ effect of the reforms of the tax/beneﬁ t 
system (the day-after effect). In other words, we ask what would have happened 
if nothing but policy rules had changed. This is achieved by comparing outcomes 
of applying the 2003 tax/beneﬁ t rules and the 2005 tax/beneﬁ t rules on the same 
micro-data (for 2003) to analyse the policy reforms between 2003 and 2005. In this 
way we can measure the ‘ﬁ rst-order’ or ‘over-night’ effects of moving from the 
2003 to the 2005 tax/beneﬁ t system, abstracting from the effects of demographic, 
macro-economic, and behavioural changes [cf. Sutherland 2002].
Concepts and deﬁ nitions
Throughout this article we use equivalised incomes, taxes, and beneﬁ ts. This 
means that we sum up, for example, the disposable income of all household 
members and then assign a proportion of this sum to each household member. 
The proportion is computed by dividing the household sum by a factor that ac-
counts for economies of scale, i.e. the fact that larger households are better off 
than smaller ones owing to the sharing of certain resources (e.g. heating).6 Excep-
tions to this rule are made in Figure 1, where, for obvious reasons, unequivalised 
4 In our case, only the pension top-up is simulated.
5 See Immervoll et al. [2006] for an assessment of these inﬂ uences.
6 We use the modiﬁ ed OECD equivalence scale as the divisor, which gives a weight of 1 to 
the ﬁ rst adult in the household, a weight of 0.5 to each additional adult, and a weight of 
0.3 to each child (under 14 years of age).
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income is used, and in Table 8, where, again for obvious reasons, unequivalised 
taxes and beneﬁ ts are used.
Income deciles are deﬁ ned by proportionally dividing the population into 
ten groups according to their equivalised disposable household income. Poverty 
is assessed using poverty rates that indicate the share of persons with equivalised 
disposable income below the poverty line. The poverty line is deﬁ ned as 60% of 
median equivalised disposable income. As we are aiming to measure the ‘over-
night’ effect of policy changes based on the situation in 2003, i.e. their effect if 
nothing else had changed, we ‘retain’ the poverty line and do not recalculate it 
after simulating the reforms. The ‘sense of (relative) poverty’ consequently also 
remains the same. With this measure, more substantial decreases in poverty rates 
are to be expected, since higher incomes do not affect the poverty line.
To apply the 2005 policy rules to the 2003 data, monetary values are up-
rated using the consumer price index to account for inﬂ ation. Thereafter, for the 
purpose of comparison, all results are adjusted to 2003 prices. For the household 
type, we deﬁ ne children according to the eligibility criteria of the family allow-
ance (Familienbeihilfe), i.e. persons under the age of 18, or under the age of 26 if 
enrolled in full-time education, and not exceeding a certain income limit.
Depending on the perspective, pensions can be classiﬁ ed as beneﬁ ts or orig-
inal income. We regard pensions as ‘state-forced savings’ and count them – with 
the exception of the pension top-up (Ausgleichszulage) – as part of the original 
income and not as beneﬁ ts.7 On the other hand we regard the child tax credit 
(Kinderabsetzbetrag) as a beneﬁ t, as it is granted as a transfer (negative tax paid 
together with the family beneﬁ t) independent of the tax liability and with no 
inﬂ uence on it.
Austria in a European context
This section is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of Austria’s position 
in Europe with regard to the structure of taxes and beneﬁ ts and its situation with 
regard to social inclusion and income distribution, as that would go beyond the 
scope of the article. The aim instead is to provide a general picture by looking at 
important and frequently used indicators.
Size and structure of taxes and beneﬁ ts
The size of the public sector in terms of revenues and social expenditures is com-
paratively large in Austria. On the revenue side, in 1998 the level of taxation (in-
cluding social security contributions) amounted to 43.9% of GDP. After reaching
7 As the only exception in the international comparison in Figure 1, pensions are counted 
as beneﬁ ts (for technical reasons).
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a peak in 2001, it decreased to 42.9% in 2003 and, mainly owing to the 2004/2005 
tax reform, it decreased to 41.9% in 2005, but is still above the OECD-Europe and 
the EU-15 averages. However, the composition of public revenues implies a rather 
low rate of progression: the share of progressive taxes on income and proﬁ ts plus 
taxes on property amounts to only 31%. The share on the OECD-Europe and EU-
15 average is considerably higher (37–38%) [OECD 2006].
The level of social expenditure in relation to GDP in Austria is somewhat 
above the EU average. In 1998 it amounted to 28.4% of GDP and increased mainly 
as a result of the extension of family beneﬁ ts by 1.1 percentage points to 29.5% in 
2003. The higher social expenditure in comparison to other European countries 
can basically be explained by the high expenditure in the categories ‘old age and 
survivors’ and ‘family’ [European Commission/Eurostat 2006].
Focusing in more detail on the instruments analysed in this paper, i.e. so-
cial security contributions, income taxes, and cash beneﬁ ts, with regard to social 
security contributions we ﬁ nd a relatively stable rate at a high level of more than 
14% of GDP in Austria, which is still clearly above the OECD-Europe and EU-15 
averages. The upper contribution limit leads to the regressive impact of social 
security contributions, as in relation to income it puts a heavier burden on low 
income groups than on higher income groups. On the other hand, the size of the 
revenues from (progressive) taxes on income and proﬁ ts is closer to the OECD-
Europe and EU-15 averages, but tends to remain below them. The latest tax re-
form reduced the share in the GDP to 12.0% in 2005 [OECD 2006].
The major part of total social expenditures consists of monetary transfers, 
which in Austria are around 72% and in the European Union around 68%. Again, 
in Austria the rate of cash beneﬁ ts as a percentage of GDP is higher than the EU 
average, and after the extension of family beneﬁ ts in 1999/2000 it amounted to
8 No data is yet available for 2005.
Table 1. Size of public sector revenues and social expenditures in % of GDP8
1998 2003
Revenues
Social 
expenditure Revenues
Social 
expenditure
Austria 43.9 28.4 42.9 29.5
OECD Europe 38.6 38.3
EU-15 40.3 27.5 39.7
28.3
(EU-25: 28.0)
Source: European Commission/Eurostat [2006]; OECD [2006].
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more than 20% in 2003 [European Commission/Eurostat 2006]. No correspond 
ing data for 2005 are available as yet, but monetary transfers derived from the 
system of national accounts indicate a decrease by 0.5 percentage points in 2005 
[BMSG 2006; Statistik Austria 2006b].
The expenditure side of the Austrian welfare state is characterised by the 
principle of horizontal equity. While in the EU-25, only a small share of cash 
beneﬁ ts goes to means-tested beneﬁ ts, in Austria the share (4%) is even smaller 
than the EU average (8%) [European Commission/Eurostat 2006]. In Austria the 
cash beneﬁ ts are dominated by beneﬁ ts within the social insurance system, which 
are related to past income levels: including pensions for civil servants, the share 
reaches 70% of all cash beneﬁ ts. The second-largest type are universal beneﬁ ts 
(mainly family-related), at a share of 15%.
In 2003, almost two-thirds of the cash beneﬁ ts were made up of old age and 
survivor beneﬁ ts, 13% are family transfers, 10% invalidity beneﬁ ts, 6% unem-
ployment beneﬁ ts, 5% cash beneﬁ ts connected with sickness and 1% are other 
transfers. Since 1998 family beneﬁ ts exhibited the biggest increase [BMSG 2006].
To this point we have been looking at the Austrian tax/beneﬁ t system from 
a macro-economic perspective. Now we will apply EUROMOD to look at the 
micro-economic side. EUROMOD covers all EU-15 member states. It constitutes 
a knowledge base on different national structures and policy systems within a 
comparative framework.10 We use it to analyse the micro-economic effects of so-
9 For 2005, no data is yet available on the European level.
10 EUROMOD relies on micro-data from twelve different sources from ﬁ fteen countries. 
None of the data providers bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretation of the 
data reported here.
Table 2.  Social security contributions, income and proﬁ t taxes, cash beneﬁ ts 
in % of GDP9
1998 2003 2005
Social 
security 
contrib.
Income 
and 
proﬁ t 
taxes
Cash 
beneﬁ ts
Social 
security 
contrib.
Income 
and 
proﬁ t 
taxes
Cash 
beneﬁ ts
Social 
security 
contrib.
Income 
and 
proﬁ t 
taxes
Cash 
beneﬁ ts
Austria 15.1 12.9 19.8 14.5 12.7 20.5 14.4 12.0 n/a
OECD Europe 11.2 13.4 11.1 12.6 n/a n/a
EU-15 11.4 14.5 18.1 11.4 13.4
18.3
(EU-25: 
18.1)
n/a n/a n/a
Source: European Commission/Eurostat [2006], OECD [2001, 2006].
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cial security contributions, income taxes, and cash beneﬁ ts in a European context 
and compare the composition of a standardised EUR 100 of disposable income 
in 1998.11
Figure 1 shows the results for an average household and for low- and high-
income households. For seven countries (Austria, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, United Kingdom) market income constitutes on average between 95% 
and 105% of disposable income, meaning that in these countries the state ‘takes 
away’ about the same amount in taxes and employee contributions as it ‘pro-
vides’ in cash beneﬁ ts. In Austria, the share of cash beneﬁ ts (including pensions) 
slightly outweighs social security contributions and income taxes. On the con-
trary, in the EU-15 the average market income is slightly higher than disposable 
income, and, like in Austria, slightly more emphasis is put on the role of income 
taxes than on that of social security contributions.
For households in the bottom decile, market incomes and state transfers 
each account for approximately 50% of disposable income in six EU-15 countries 
(Austria, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Spain, and Sweden). This is also the case 
for the EU-15 average. In Austria people in the lowest income decile pay only so-
cial security contributions and almost no taxes, whereas on average in the EU-15 
the share of each of the two instruments is almost equal.
Looking at households in the top decile, in practically all countries the share 
of income taxes to be paid is higher than the share of social security contribu-
tions. This relates to upper contribution limits for social security contributions 
and to progressive income tax scales. An interesting pattern is that the share of 
beneﬁ ts is considerably higher in Austria compared to other countries. In part 
this can be explained by the fact that income is more equally distributed than in 
other EU countries, but it is also a reﬂ ection of the importance of social-insurance 
related and universal beneﬁ ts in Austria. Moreover, in Austria public pensions 
– especially of civil servants – form a considerable portion of disposable income 
in the top decile, while in other countries public pensions are of less importance 
for the top decile.
Poverty rates and inequality of income distribution
According to European convention, 60% of the median equivalised income con-
stitutes the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which in 2003 in Austria was EUR 10 182 
for a one-person household per year (1998: 8628).12 About 13% of people in Austria 
11 Note that in the scope of the model major parts of taxes (e.g. indirect taxes) and beneﬁ ts 
(e.g. beneﬁ ts in kind, public services) are not included. Public pensions are classiﬁ ed as 
beneﬁ ts here.
12 In this paper the year relates to the year the incomes refer to. As Eurostat deﬁ nes the 
year after the year the data was gathered (= income year+1), the listed ﬁ gures can be found 
under the year 2004 (incomes 2003) on the Eurostat website.
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Figure 1.  Composition of EUR 100 of disposable income in Austria 
and other EU countries, 1998
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Source: Euromod (Christine Lietz’s calculations).
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were living in households with an equivalised income below the threshold (1998: 
12%). In a European comparison this at-risk-of-poverty rate is relatively low, at 
3 to 4 percentage points below the EU-25 and EU-15 averages. Both in Austria and 
on the European average, at-risk-of-poverty rates are higher for women than for 
men.
Table 3 also shows the at-risk-of-poverty-rates for children (in this case de-
ﬁ ned as persons under the age of 16) and elderly people (aged 65 and over) in 
contrast to the rates for the whole population. In Austria, both children and, in 
particular, elderly people face a higher at-risk-of-poverty rate than the total popu-
lation. With regard to child poverty, Austria ranks consistently lower than the EU 
average, while in terms of old-age poverty Austria found itself clearly above the 
EU average in 1998 but slightly below it in 2003 [Eurostat-New Cronos 2007].
Not just overall poverty rates are lower, but also the disposable equivalised 
income of households is more equally distributed in Austria than on the Euro-
pean average. The Gini-coefﬁ cient shows the percentage of income concentration, 
which amounts to 26% in Austria. On average in the EU it amounts to about 30%.
Table 3. Poverty rates in Austria and in the EU, 1998 and 2003 (%)
 1998 2003
Total Men Women <16 >64 Total Men Women <16 >64
Austria 12 10 14 14 24 13 11 14 15 17
EU-25 16 15 17 19 17 16 15 17 20 18
EU-15 16 15 17 19 17 17 15 18 20 19
EU-10 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 16 16 16 22 9
Note: Poverty rate: share of people living in households with disposable income below 
the poverty line; poverty line: 60% of median equivalised disposable household income.
Source: Eurostat-New Cronos [2007].
Table 4. Gini-coefﬁ cients in Austria and in the EU, 1998 and 2003
 1998 2003
Austria 0.26 0.26
EU-25 0.29 0.30
EU-15 0.29 0.30
NMS-10 nd 0.30
Note: Based on equivalised disposable household income.
Source: Eurostat-New Cronos [2007].
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To sum up, the amount of the social security contributions and income and 
proﬁ t taxes on the one hand and cash beneﬁ ts on the other is relatively large in 
Austria. This means that on average the state draws a relatively high share of mar-
ket incomes in the form of contributions and taxes but also provides a relatively 
high share of cash beneﬁ ts to private households. In contrast to the other Euro-
pean countries, (basically regressive) social insurance contributions play a more 
important role than (progressive) taxes on income and proﬁ ts. Both at-risk-of-
poverty rates and the inequality of income distribution (measured in equivalised 
disposable income) are below the EU average.
Changes in tax/beneﬁ t policies 2003–2005
In this chapter, we will ﬁ rst describe the most important policy changes imple-
mented between July 2003 and June 2005 in Austria, which are covered by the 
analysis. Thereafter, the main part of this chapter refers to the distributional con-
sequences of the implemented policy reforms.
Description of the changes taken into account in the analysis
In the period under review the main changes in tax/beneﬁ t policies were intro-
duced in the 2004/2005 tax reform. Contributions to health insurance were also 
raised and some small changes took place on the beneﬁ t side.
Regarding social insurance contributions, while in 2003 employees were 
required to make contributions between 17.65% (white collar) and 18.2% (blue 
collar) of gross income for social security, subsidised housing and compulsory 
contributions to the legal representation of interests, in 2005 these contributions 
amounted to between 18.0% (white collar) and 18.2% (blue collar). The increase 
of the total contribution rate is a result of the increased contributions to health 
insurance, which affected pensioners (who pay only contributions to health in-
surance), the self-employed, farmers, and civil servants, who have their own con-
tribution rates. Table 5 contains the changes for the most important groups:
In general these changes led to a heavier burden on all groups, with pension-
ers being the most affected. Because of the upper contribution limit, the changes 
tend to have a (small) regressive impact.
With the objective of increasing the employment rate of the elderly and ex-
tending their participation in the labour market, alongside other measures, contri-
butions to unemployment insurance were abolished for female employees above 
56 years of age and male employees above 58 years of age. This measure beneﬁ ts 
elderly employees and consequently usually people with higher incomes.
In the course of the pension reform in 2004, the pension contributions of ac-
tive federal civil servants were again differentiated. Within the group of civil serv-
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ants, this meant a (slight) redistribution in favour of younger groups with less 
income.
In 2004 the pension contribution rate for federal civil-servant pensioners 
was raised by one percentage point to (depending on the date of retirement) 3.1% 
or 3.3%.
In 2005, the upper contribution limit for social security contributions was 
raised, extraordinarily, by 5.2% [BMSG 2006]. This puts a somewhat higher bur-
den on higher income groups.
The 2004/2005 income tax reform was introduced in two stages. Within the 
ﬁ rst stage tax credits targeting families were further increased: Supplements with 
regard to the number of children were added to the single-earner/single-parent 
tax credit (thus far at a uniform EUR 364 per year), which are also paid as nega-
tive tax:
– EUR 130 for the ﬁ rst child,
– EUR 175 for the second child, and
– EUR 220 for each additional child.
In addition, the income limit for the spouse for the single-earner tax credit 
was increased from EUR 4400 to EUR 6000 per year, if the couple has at least one 
child.
The second stage of the 2004/2005 tax reform integrated the increased gen-
eral tax credit into the regular income tax schedule. The tax schedule was reduced 
to four income brackets with three marginal tax rates from 38.33% to 50%,14 and 
the tax-free zone was enlarged [Breuss et al. 2004; BMSG 2004].
The tax reform results in about 350 000 persons more who owing to low 
income do not have to pay income tax; out of the about 5.9 million people subject 
to income tax, about 2.55 million are exempt from paying tax. However, as the 
general negative tax was not increased, people without or with very low income 
are not relieved by the tax reform.
13 Excluding contributions by employers.
14 However, a special ﬂ at rate of 6% applies to the 13th and 14th salary payments of em-
ployees and lowers the marginal tax rates.
Table 5. Contributions to health insurance 2003 and 2005 in % of gross income13
Blue-collar 
workers
White-collar 
workers
Self-em-
ployed Farmers
Civil 
servants Pensioners
2003 3.95% 3.40% 8.90% 6.40% 3.95% 3.75%
2005 3.95% 3.75% 9.10% 7.50% 4.10% 4.95%
Source: HV SV [2003, 2005].
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The highest relative tax savings occur at a yearly taxable income of EUR 
11 000 (6.1%). The savings are reduced to 0.7% when income increases to EUR 
22 000 and slightly rise again to 1.6% when income increases to EUR 35 000. For 
higher incomes the savings drop continuously. In comparison to 2003, up to a 
yearly income (gross minus social insurance contributions) of EUR 50 000, the ﬁ s-
cal drag is compensated for all income recipients [Breuss et al. 2004]. The changes 
concerning the single-earner/single-parent tax credit also improved the situation 
of single parents, who are exposed to an above-average risk of poverty.
The changes in cash beneﬁ ts affected pensions and family beneﬁ ts. The cu-
mulated increase of the pension top-up between 2003 and 2005 (3.0% for single 
persons) was higher than the increase for average pensions but below the devel-
opment of the consumer price index (cumulated 4.4%). However, in 2004, there 
was an extraordinary increase in the pension top-up for couples of 5.1% [cf. HV 
SV 2006: 89]. In the period under investigation only the ﬁ nancial safeguarding of 
low pensions of couples was secured.
In the area of family-related beneﬁ ts only minor changes occurred between 
2003 and 2005. In general, the changes were more in favour of low-income groups 
but were small in extent:
– in 2004 the childcare beneﬁ t was increased by 50% for multiple births;
–  for the means-tested supplement to the childcare beneﬁ t (approx. EUR 181 per 
month) the personal income limit was increased from EUR 3997 to EUR 5200 
per year in 2004;
–  along with the extraordinary increase of the upper contribution limit for social 
security contributions, the limit of the yearly taxable family income for eligi-
Table 6. Income tax: tax rates and bands
Up to 2004* Since 2005**
Tax bands Rate Tax bands Rate
For the ﬁ rst EUR 3640 0% For the ﬁ rst EUR 10 000 0%
For an additional EUR 3630 
(up to EUR 7270) 21%
For an additional EUR 15 000 
(to EUR 25 000) 38.33%
For an additional EUR 14 530 
(to EUR 21 800) 31%
For an additional EUR 26 000 
(to EUR 51 000) 43.60%
For an additional EUR 29 070 
(to EUR 50 870) 41% For all additional amounts 50%
For all additional amounts 50% – –
Note: Income liable to tax: gross income minus social security contributions; * General tax 
credit not integrated; ** General tax credit already integrated.
Source: Einkommensteuergesetz (Income Tax Act), § 33 [2003, 2005].
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bility for the surcharge on family allowance with three or more children was 
increased by 5.2% in 2005 [AK 2004, 2005].
Besides these small changes, the main family beneﬁ ts (family allowance, 
child tax credit, childcare beneﬁ t) were neither changed nor ‘indexed’ in the pe-
riod between 2003 and 2005. In Austria, family beneﬁ ts are generally not indexed, 
which means that (without reforms) the beneﬁ t amounts proportionally fall short 
of other incomes.
Empirical ﬁ ndings
Table 7 shows the population broken down into different groups (by gender, age 
and household type) and the averages of these groups’ equivalised disposable 
household incomes per month in the year 2003. Persons living in single-parent 
households (78% of total average income) and persons living in households of 
couples with three children or more (80% of total average income) are the poor-
est population groups under consideration. The group with the highest income 
are persons in non-single households without children (111% of total average in-
come).
Children (under the age of 18) have a lower income than the population 
average, while the elderly (60 years and older) are slightly above the population 
average. Moreover, there is a gap between the disposable household income of 
women (98% of total average) and men (102% of total average).
Looking at income deciles, the total average income is exceeded in the 7th 
decile. In the lowest decile the average income is less than half of the total average 
(44%), and in the highest decile more than twice of the total average (206%).
Looking at the effects of changes in the tax/beneﬁ t system, Figure 2 shows 
changes in household disposable income. On average, the policy reforms between 
2003 and 2005 resulted in a 0.4% increase of disposable household income. Figure 
2 shows no clear pattern with regard to progressivity. While there is almost no 
change in the top and the bottom deciles, the lower deciles gain slightly more 
than the higher deciles with the highest gains in decile 3 (plus 0.9%). This pat-
tern is caused by the interaction of the reliefs stemming from the tax reform in 
2004-2005 and the non-indexation of family beneﬁ ts; the latter leads (isolated 
from other changes) to losses in real income (see below).
The reduction in disposable household income owing to the non-indexa-
tion of family beneﬁ ts becomes more evident when the changes in disposable 
income are regarded from the perspective of different household types. House-
holds without children gain on average more than household types with chil-
dren. However, the differences are not very large (multiple-person households 
without children gain 0.6%, singles 0.4%).
The same is true for differences with respect to age groups: people of work-
ing age gain slightly more (plus 0.5%) than children (plus 0.3%) and the elder-
socrev2007-1.indb   624 3.9.2007   18:41:40
Michael Fuchs and Christine Lietz: Effects of Changes in Tax/Beneﬁ t Policies in Austria 2003–2005
625
ly (plus 0.4%). This may be explained by the non-indexation of family beneﬁ ts on 
the one hand and the raise in health insurance contributions, which affects the 
elderly over-proportionally, on the other.
Figure 3 shows the effect of the policy reforms on poverty rates. Consider-
ing the modest impact of the reforms on income distribution, and taking into 
account the conﬁ dence interval (95%), the policy changes in the period under 
investigation had no inﬂ uence on poverty rates in general. Poverty rates did not 
change signiﬁ cantly according to age and gender either. If we look at different 
Table 7. Average equivalised disposable income by population group, 2003
Share of 
population
In EUR 
monthly
% of total 
average
All 100.0% 1641 100.0%
Decile 1 10.0% 725 44.2%
Decile 2 10.0% 973 59.3%
Decile 3 10.0% 1140 69.5%
Decile 4 10.0% 1276 77.8%
Decile 5 10.0% 1417 86.4%
Decile 6 10.0% 1573 95.9%
Decile 7 10.0% 1735 105.7%
Decile 8 10.0% 1940 118.2%
Decile 9 10.0% 2250 137.2%
Decile 10 10.0% 3381 206.1%
Hh type*: single 14.5% 1574 95.9%
Hh type: single parent 3.9% 1284 78.2%
Hh type: ma no child 34.9% 1819 110.9%
Hh type: ma 1–2 children 37.5% 1618 98.6%
Hh type: ma 3+ children 9.1% 1313 80.0%
Age 0–17 20.4% 1471 89.6%
Age 18–59 58.6% 1694 103.3%
Age 60+ 21.0% 1657 101.0%
Female 51.4% 1608 98.0%
Male 48.6% 1675 102.1%
* Hh=household; ma = more (than one) adult; share of persons living in such an hh. 
Decile groups based on equivalised disposable household income.
Source: Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 (authors’calculations).
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household types, some poverty reduction (more than one percentage point based 
on a ‘retained’ poverty line) for single parents and couples with three or more 
children can be observed. Here, the extension of the single-parent/single-earner 
tax credit including negative tax is decisive.
We now turn our investigation to an assessment of the instruments driving 
the changes. Following the previous analysis it can be assumed that, as regards 
changes in income distribution, the effect of the reliefs provided by the 2004/2005 
tax reform on the one hand and of the non-indexation of family beneﬁ ts between 
2003 and 2005 on the other hand is counteracting. In addition, for speciﬁ c popula-
tion groups, speciﬁ c policy changes (e.g. the extension of the single-parent/sin-
gle-earner tax credit for single parents and couples with three or more children, or 
the increase in health insurance contributions for the elderly) seem to play a role. 
To assess the contribution of different groups of instruments to overall changes 
in more detail, we split total changes in disposable income into changes related 
to social security contributions, income taxes and cash beneﬁ ts. This analysis is 
accompanied by an analysis of the share of social security contributions, income 
taxes, the cash beneﬁ ts paid/received by each income quintile, and the respective 
changes between 2003 and 2005, and an assessment of the redistributional effect 
of each instrument group over time.
Figure 2.  Average percentage change in real disposable income 2003–2005, 
decile groups
Note: Decile groups based on equivalised disposable household income in 2003.
Source: Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 (authors’ calculations).
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Figure 4 presents the average changes in disposable income per decile (as in 
Figure 2); the different colours indicate the composition of these changes. From 
the perspective of households, increases in beneﬁ ts and decreases in social secu-
rity contributions and income taxes are presented on the positive side (above the 
0.0%-line); in the same sense, decreases in beneﬁ ts and increases in social insur-
ance contributions and income taxes are shown on the negative side (below the 
0.0%-line).
In sum, increases in disposable income stem from tax reliefs (the 2004/2005 
tax reform). In contrast, decreased beneﬁ ts – mainly due to the non-indexation of 
family beneﬁ ts – and increased social security contributions, i.e. health insurance 
contributions, decrease disposable income. However, on average the gains de-
rived from tax reliefs outweigh these losses. The 2004/2005 tax reform noticeably 
strengthened household disposable income.
However, particularly for the bottom decile, gains from paying less tax are 
equalised by losses in beneﬁ ts and increases in social security contributions. On 
the one hand, this development is due to the fact that the 2004/2005 tax reform 
did not increase the general negative tax (only the income bracket eligible for 
Figure 3. Change in poverty rates 2003-2005, household types
Note: ma = more (than one) adult; Poverty rate: share of people living in households with 
disposable income below the poverty line; Poverty line: 60% of median equivalised dis-
posable household income in 2003; Statistical reliability of the estimates is shown using 
conﬁ dence intervals at the 5% level
Source: Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 (authors’ calculations).
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the negative tax was extended). Consequently, the tax reform does little to pro-
vide relief to people without or with very low incomes [Breuss et al. 2004]. On 
the other hand, children are more concentrated in the lower income deciles and 
income from family beneﬁ ts forms quite an important part of the total income in 
these households. Therefore, the non-indexation of family beneﬁ ts has a stronger 
impact on low incomes.
For income deciles above the second decile – following the structure of the 
tax reform – the gains from the tax reform decrease continuously, but so do the 
losses derived from the non-indexation of family beneﬁ ts. In terms of higher so-
cial security contributions, the higher income deciles are also affected by the ex-
traordinary rise in the upper contribution limit. As a result, in the highest decile 
the increases in social security contributions almost make up for the gains stem-
ming from the tax reform.
Regarding different household types households with children experience 
somewhat higher gains in tax reliefs, as some of them are especially targeted at 
families with children, like the additional amounts for children within the single-
earner/single-parent tax credit. However, in real income terms these gains are 
substantially reduced by reductions in family beneﬁ ts.
SI contributions
Taxes
Beneﬁts
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
–0.5%
–1.0%
–1.5%
2 109876543All 1
Figure 4.  Average percentage change in real disposable income 2003–2005, decile 
groups
Note: Decile groups based on equivalised disposable household income in 2003.
Source: Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 (authors’ calculations).
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When the changes in disposable household income are analysed by age 
groups, it can be observed that the gains from the 2004/2005 tax reform are more 
or less equally distributed among the age groups. The differences lie in the reduc-
tions of disposable income caused by the non-indexation of family beneﬁ ts and 
the increase in social security contributions. Clearly, children are most affected by 
the non-indexation of family beneﬁ ts. On the other hand, the elderly are strongly 
affected by the increase in health insurance contributions, as pensioners were the 
group with the highest increase in contributions, and these contributions play 
quite an important role in relation to their total income.
When the changes in disposable household income between 2003 and 2005 
are broken down according to the different tax-beneﬁ t instruments, we can ana-
lyse the development in the share of social security contributions, income taxes, 
and cash beneﬁ ts paid/received by each income quintile. In general, it is evident 
that lower income groups receive a higher share in total cash beneﬁ ts than the 
share of the total social security contributions and total income taxes they have to 
pay, whereas for higher income groups the opposite is true.
In 2003, the bottom quintile paid 6% of all social security contributions and 
2% of all income taxes and received 32% of all cash beneﬁ ts. In contrast, 12% of 
all cash beneﬁ ts went into the top quintile, while it made 38% of all social security 
contributions and 59% of all income taxes.
Looking at the development between 2003 and 2005, there was practically 
no change in the distribution of social security contributions and cash beneﬁ ts 
across income quintiles. This can be explained by the fact that health insurance 
Table 8. Share of instrument per income group, 2003 and 2005 (%)
2003 2005
Social 
security 
contribu-
tions
Income
taxes
Cash
beneﬁ ts
Social 
security 
contribu-
tions
Income
taxes
Cash
beneﬁ ts
Quintile 1 6.2 1.9 31.6 6.3 1.2 31.7
Quintile 2 12.7 6.8 22.1 12.7 5.9 22.1
Quintile 3 18.3 12.2 18.6 18.2 11.7 18.5
Quintile 4 24.7 20.2 15.4 24.6 20.1 15.4
Quintile 5 38.1 58.9 12.2 38.1 61.1 12.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Quintile groups based on equivalised disposable household income in 2003 and 
2005.
Source: Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 (authors’ calculations).
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contributions were raised for all population groups – the differences are related 
to different occupational groups but not to income groups. In the case of beneﬁ ts, 
some minor changes and the general non-indexation of family beneﬁ ts did not 
change the distribution across the income quintiles.
On the income tax side, the 2004/2005 tax reform led to small changes in 
the distribution across income quintiles: the proportion of taxes paid by the top 
quintile (up two percentage points) increased in favour of the lower four quin-
tiles. This is due to the structure of the tax reform with the extension of the tax-
free zone on the one hand and the retention of the 50% marginal tax rate for high 
incomes on the other hand, leading to continuously decreasing gains from the tax 
reform for higher incomes.
Table 9. Redistributional effect of tax/beneﬁ t-instruments, 2003 and 2005
2003
 
Gini
pre
Gini
post
RS
index*
Rate**
Kakwani
index
Reranking
index
SIC*** 0.337 0.340 -0.002 0.135 -0.013 0.002
Std.error 0.00568 0.00563 0.00001 0.00064 0.00003 0.00004
Taxes 0.340 0.295 0.047 0.179 0.217 0.002
Std.error 0.00168 0.00155 0.00014 0.00098 0.00075 0.00002
Beneﬁ ts 0.295 0.239 0.064 0.110 0.640 0.008
Std.error 0.00035 0.00012 0.00122 0.00180 0.00296 0.00075
2005
 
Gini
Pre
Gini
post
RS
index*
Rate**
Kakwani
index
Reranking
index
SIC*** 0.337 0.340 -0.002 0.138 -0.014 0.001
Std.error 0.00621 0.00759 0.00138 0.00225 0.00873 0.00001
Taxes 0.340 0.292 0.050 0.169 0.247 0.002
Std.error 0.00217 0.00116 0.00098 0.00069 0.00359 0.00002
Beneﬁ ts 0.292 0.238 0.061 0.106 0.637 0.007
Std.error 0.00171 0.00223 0.00124 0.00240 0.00001 0.00072
* Reynolds-Smolensky index
** size of instrument in percentage of base
*** social insurance contributions
Source: Euromod based on EU-SILC 2004 (authors’ calculations).
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The above results concerning the distribution of the instrument groups 
across income quintiles suggest that the progressivity of income taxes increased 
slightly, whereas there was no change in the progressivity of social security con-
tributions and cash beneﬁ ts. To evaluate whether this ﬁ rst assessment can be 
proved, Table 9 shows the standard measures for redistribution.
The Reynolds-Smolensky Index of Redistribution represents the difference 
between income inequality before and after applying an instrument, measured by 
the Gini-coefﬁ cient and the ‘re-ranking’ index. The redistributive effect indicated 
by the index can be further broken down into progressivity and ‘importance’. 
Progressivity indicates the ‘pro-poor’ nature – if for example taxes or contribu-
tions are disproportionately higher in the upper (lower) part of income distribu-
tion, then they are progressive (regressive). We measure progressivity using the 
Kakwani index, which is positive for progressive instruments and negative for 
regressive instruments. The amount of redistribution an instrument can achieve 
not only depends on its progressivity but also on its importance. The importance 
is indicated by the rate, that is, by the (average) rate that is applied to the base 
income for calculating the instrument. (The Appendix provides a more compre-
hensive description of the measures used.)
The Reynolds-Smolensky- and the Kakwani indexes demonstrate the insig-
niﬁ cance of changes in social security contributions and cash beneﬁ ts concerning 
redistribution. The indexes also conﬁ rm that the redistributive impact of income 
taxes increased with the 2004/2005 tax reform, but the rise is somewhat modest. 
Not surprisingly, the higher redistributional effect of income taxes stems from the 
higher progressivity of the instrument (indicated by the Kakwani index) and not 
from the ‘importance’ of the instrument, as tax rates were lowered. However, in 
terms of redistribution (under the assumption of full take-up), cash beneﬁ ts are 
still the most important instrument. Due to the upper-contribution limit, social 
insurance contributions even show a regressive effect.
Conclusion
The aim of this analysis is to evaluate whether policy reforms in Austria were 
successful in meeting redistributive objectives and in reducing poverty. The main 
ﬁ ndings based on the tax/beneﬁ t micro-simulation model EUROMOD relating 
to equivalised disposable household income are:
Changes in the tax/beneﬁ t system between 2003 and 2005 (mainly the 
2004/2005 tax reform and increases in health insurance contributions since 2004) 
led in sum to an average gain of 0.4% in disposable household income. In general, 
the measures had no signiﬁ cant impact on income distribution or poverty. While 
there was almost no change in disposable income in the top and bottom deciles, 
the lower deciles gained slightly more than the higher deciles.
On average households without children proﬁ ted more than households 
with children. However, some poverty reduction for single parents and couples 
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with three or more children can be observed. With respect to age groups, people 
of working age gained slightly more than children and the elderly.
If we look at the instruments driving the changes, we ﬁ nd that all popula-
tion groups beneﬁ ted from the 2004/2005 tax reform. However, as the tax reform 
did not increase the (general) negative tax and retained the 50% marginal tax rate 
for high incomes, the gains are relatively low in the bottom decile, but are the 
highest in the second decile, from where they decrease continuously with rising 
income. A noteworthy ﬁ nding is that increases in disposable income arising from 
the tax reform were to a certain extent lowered by losses in beneﬁ ts (in terms of 
real income). These losses are due to the fact that in Austria family beneﬁ ts are not 
‘indexed’, that is, they do not rise with inﬂ ation or income growth. Consequently, 
beneﬁ t amounts fall proportionally short of other incomes. Especially affected 
were households with children, meaning that lower income groups were over-
proportionally affected, as children are more concentrated in low-income house-
holds, and in the case of single parents and couples with three or more children 
state transfers, in particular family beneﬁ ts, make up for a relatively high share 
of their total income.15 However, the extension of the single-parent/single-earner 
tax credit in the 2004/2005 tax reform (including negative tax for families with 
children) supported those vulnerable groups. The elderly were mostly affected 
by the increase in health insurance contributions, as pensioners were the group 
with the highest increase in contributions, and these contributions play quite an 
important role in relation to their income.
In total, the preponderance of gains from the tax reform led to an increase in 
disposable income. However, as mentioned above, in the bottom decile the gains 
were fully offset, mainly owing to the losses (in terms of real incomes) caused by 
the non-indexation of family beneﬁ ts, and in the top decile as a result of higher 
social security contributions connected with the extraordinary increase in the up-
per contribution limit.
Another important part of the analysis related to the share of instruments 
(social security contributions, income taxes, cash beneﬁ ts) paid/received per 
income group and the redistributional effect of the instruments over time.16 In 
general, the upper contribution limit of social security contributions and the pro-
gressive scale of income tax cause the income tax to be much more concentrated 
among higher income groups than social security contributions. Also, cash ben-
eﬁ ts – despite the high share of social-insurance-related and universal beneﬁ ts 
– favour people with less income. Regarding social-insurance-related beneﬁ ts, 
this at ﬁ rst glance surprising diagnosis stems from the fact that the probability 
of becoming unemployed or sick is higher in lower income classes. In the case of 
15 However, this has to be put into context: in Austria cash beneﬁ ts for families were sig-
niﬁ cantly increased until 2003 and are quite generous in an international comparison.
16 The analysis is based on the assumption of full take-up of beneﬁ ts, in particular social 
assistance beneﬁ ts. Pensions, with the exception of pension top-up, are counted as original 
income.
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universal family beneﬁ ts, the vertical redistributive impact is caused by the dis-
tribution over the life cycle (high beneﬁ t intensity around birth, children are more 
concentrated in lower income groups) [Guger 1996, 1998, 2005].
In 2005, the bottom quintile paid 6% of all social security contributions and 
1% of all income taxes and received 32% of all cash beneﬁ ts. On the other hand, 
the highest quintile brought in 38% of all social security contributions and 61% 
of all income taxes and beneﬁ ted from 12% of all cash beneﬁ ts. Between 2003 and 
2005 no substantial changes in the distribution of instruments is notable; the tax 
reform in 2004/2005 increased the proportion of taxes paid by the top quintile 
(up two percentage points) in favour of the lower four quintiles.
To reﬁ ne the assessment of the distributional effects of the instrument groups, 
we use a range of standard measures on income inequality (e.g. the Reynolds-Smo-
lensky Index of Redistribution based on the difference between income inequality 
before and after applying an instrument). Cash beneﬁ ts have both in 2003 and 
2005 the highest redistributive impact of the three instruments, although the redis-
tributive impact of income taxes was slightly raised after the 2004/2005 tax reform. 
Social security contributions – owing to the upper contribution limit – even have a 
slightly regressive impact and showed no changes in the period under investiga-
tion. In sum, the size of the redistributive impact from high to low income classes 
is considerable. Measured by equivalised household income, the Gini for original 
gross income stands at 0.34 in comparison to 0.24 for net disposable income.
To conclude, our analysis indicates that tax/beneﬁ t reforms between 2003 
and 2005 – despite producing an average increase of disposable income – had 
no strong impact on income distribution and poverty. It is noteworthy that the 
reforms were not budget neutral but were implemented at the cost of a higher 
budget deﬁ cit. However, the effect of the 2004/2005 tax reform will be compen-
sated after 2005 by the ﬁ scal drag. Our investigation also indicates that there is 
still a comparatively high poverty rate among vulnerable groups like single par-
ents and couples with three or more children. This means that it is still necessary 
to put combating poverty and social exclusion at the centre of political efforts.
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Appendix: Measures of redistribution
The measures of income redistribution and progressivity used in this paper are 
based on a family of indices based on the single-parameter Gini (or S-Gini) [Don-
aldson and Weymark 1980; Yitzhaki 1983]. The redistributive effect, ΠRE, of taxes 
and/or beneﬁ ts is measured as the difference between the Gini coefﬁ cients of in-
come before and after taxes and/or beneﬁ ts. This difference can be decomposed 
into vertical equity and re-ranking. Vertical equity is measured by the Reynolds-
Smolensky index, ΠRS, [Reynolds and Smolensky 1977] which is deﬁ ned as the 
difference between the Gini coefﬁ cient for income before taxes and/or beneﬁ ts 
and the concentration index17 of income after taxes and/or beneﬁ ts. Re-ranking is 
measured by the re-ranking index, D, which is deﬁ ned as the difference between 
the generalised Gini coefﬁ cient for income after taxes and/or beneﬁ ts and the 
generalised concentration index of income after taxes and/or beneﬁ ts.
ΠRT
E
B = GX – GX+TB
                 = ΠRT
S
B – D (1)
                 = [GX – CX+TB] – [GX+TB – CX+TB]
Progressivity is measured using the Kakwani index ΠK [see Kakwani 1977]. 
This is deﬁ ned as the difference between the generalised concentration index of 
taxes and the generalised Gini coefﬁ cient for income before taxes.
ΠKT = CT – GX (2)
Equation (3) shows the relationship between the Reynolds-Smolensky and 
the Kakwani indices:
            tΠRT
S  = ——    ΠKT           1– t (3)
            bρRB
S  = ——    ρKB          1– b
where t is the average tax rate and b the average beneﬁ t rate.
17 The concentration index is the Gini index for the concentration curve.
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